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Most Berkeley commentators agree that Berkeley’s theory of self-awareness depends on some 
type of direct introspective access to the self. In this paper, I challenge this consensus view, 
arguing that Berkeley’s theory does not claim that there is direct introspective access to the self 
until after his first publication of the Principles of Human Knowledge in 1710. The first edition of 
the Principles, as well as Berkeley’s Philosophical Notebooks, reveal a significantly different, 
perhaps more “Humean,” perspective concerning self-awareness than his works after 1710. 
During this period, Berkeley thought that the self cannot be encountered directly through 
introspection, but is in fact knowable only by means of an inference which integrates a crucial 
causal maxim. Further, I argue that Berkeley thought the causal maxim which grounds his 
argument for the existence of the self is itself grounded in experience. Berkeley’s early position on 
self-knowledge interestingly anticipates Hume’s criticism of the introspective availability of the 
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Theories of self-knowledge that argue for a substantial self distinct from material bodies often 
rely upon some type of special, direct introspective access to one’s own self, mind, or soul. The 
theories diverge with regards to exactly how the self is encountered in introspection, but all share 
in that they ground self-knowledge in some type of direct introspective awareness of the self. For 
instance, according to some interpreters, Descartes claims that one can be acquainted with the 
self as an object of the understanding.1 Russell also at one point considered that there might be 
acquaintance with the self, though he ultimately rejected the position.2 Others like Malebranche 
endorse a theory where the self is known by an “internal consciousness” of oneself as the subject 
of thought or action. These types of accounts all share the claim that the self can be encountered 
directly through introspection; a mere act of turning the mind towards itself yields a direct 
apprehension of the self, which justifies knowledge of the existence of the self. 
But many philosophers, myself included, are skeptical of such claims to introspective access 
to the self, and therefore remain dubious of such accounts of self-knowledge. For many, Hume’s 
attack on these types of attempts to find the self through introspection motivates this doubt. 
Whatever substantial, distinct self that is commonly supposed to exist mysteriously eludes us 
                                                        
 
1  Whether Descartes himself thought the self is directly introspectible is a matter of some 
controversy; see Marleen Rozemond, “The Nature of the Mind,” in The Blackwell Guide to Descartes’ 
Meditations, ed. Stephen Gaukroger (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2006), especially pg. 57.  
2  Russell was considering this possibility through 1912 with his publication of the Problems of 
Philosophy. However, by 1913, his views had changed; his unpublished manuscript from that time shows 
him claiming that the self can only be known by description and not by any type of acquaintance. This 
1913 position is in many ways similar to the position I argue Berkeley accepts from 1708-1710. 
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whenever we search for it, even to the very limits of our experience. Where we expect a clear and 
determinate experience of ourselves, we are instead confronted by the absence of any such 
experience. This surprising absence often leads empiricists to a skeptical or deflationary stance 
towards the self.3 
However, there is one potentially surprising exception to the conventional empiricist response 
to the non-introspectability of the self: George Berkeley. Though as his career progresses his 
position waxes Malebranchean, Berkeley’s early position occupies a unique position which denies 
any introspective awareness of the self and yet affirms the existence of a substantial self (spirit) 
distinct from the objects of experience (ideas). In this way, Berkeley actually anticipates Hume’s 
criticism of the introspective theories of self-knowledge, and develops a response that adheres to 
this Humean criticism while making a case for the existence of a substantial and distinct self.  
In this paper I argue that in his early Philosophical Notebooks (c. 1708) as well as his first 
edition of the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), Berkeley maintained that the self cannot be 
known by some special introspective awareness, but rather can only be inferred based on one’s 
experience of the objects of perception and thought. This inference involves a type of causal 
maxim, which Berkeley intriguingly also attempts to ground in experience. If this causal maxim 
is true, then I think Berkeley’s argument for the self is in fact sound, and thus one could indeed 
claim to know that she/he exists without having any special direct introspective access to the self. 
And while the causal maxim and Berkeley’s attempt to ground it in experience is riddled with 
difficulties, Berkeley’s early theory of self-knowledge may be useful to any empiricist who like 
                                                        
 
3  There are many relatively non-empirical responses to Hume’s criticism of introspection which 
accept that self-awareness is not direct and yet affirm that there is indirect awareness of the self. These 
accounts usually rely on a principle like “every thought has a thinker,” which is not justified empirically. 
For a robust account of many current accounts of self-awareness, see Brie Gertler, Self-Knowledge, 
(London: Routledge, 2010), pg. 208-252. 
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Hume denies that there is any direct experience of the self, yet is not so skeptical concerning the 
causal maxim. 
In §1, I give a sketch of my interpretation of Berkeley’s theory of mind in the Notebooks and 
first edition of the Principles. I pay particular attention to his denial that there can be an idea of 
the self and his affirmation of the existence of a distinct, active self. In §2, I discuss the common 
contemporary interpretations of Berkeley’s theory of self-knowledge, which allege that Berkeley 
thinks the self is known through a direct introspective awareness of the self. In §3, I argue that 
these interpretations are deficient because they do not recognize the important shift in Berkeley’s 
theory between his 1710 publication of the Principles and 1713 publication of the Dialogues. In 
§4, I delineate what I take to be Berkeley’s early argument for the existence of the self, which relies 
on a causal maxim. I resolve some difficulties with Berkeley’s argument by modifying his notion 
of causation in a way that is consistent his theory of mind discussed in §1-3. In §5, I discuss 
Berkeley’s grounding of the causal maxim with regards to Humean worries about causation. I 
suggest that Berkeley actually believed (at least in his early period) that causation is directly 
experienced, though not by way of idea. 
 
Berkeley’s Theory of Mind 
In this section, I consider Berkeley’s theory of mind as it develops in the Notebooks to its 
restatement in the Principles. I focus on two key characteristics of Berkeley’s theory of mind; first, 
anticipating Hume, Berkeley denies that there can be any direct apprehension of the self via idea, 
and second, Berkeley affirms the existence of an active being that is itself distinct from the objects 
of its experience. This being he calls spirit, soul, or mind, and he identifies the self with it. 
Berkeley’s apparently Humean remarks appear in his early Philosophical Notebooks. Here, 
Berkeley offers a psychological description of attempts to introspect the self, in a way that is 
strikingly similar to Hume’s famous remarks in Treatise 1.4.6.3: 
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+ Consult, ramsack yr Understanding wt find you there besides several perceptions or 
thoughts. Wt mean you by the word mind you must mean something that you perceive or 
yt you do not perceive. a thing not perceived is a contradiction. to mean also a thing you do 
not perceive is a contradiction. (Notebooks 579) 
The argument in this passage can be summarized as follows: 
(1) If x exists, x can be perceived (i.e. there can be an idea of x). 
(2) Therefore, if the mind exists, then the mind can be perceived (i.e. there can be an 
idea of the mind). 
(3) There can be no perception of a mind (i.e there can be no idea of a mind). 
 Therefore, the mind does not exist. 
Following this argument Berkeley redefines mind in a way that makes it consistent with (1) 
and thus (2): 
+ Mind is a congeries of Perceptions. Take away Perceptions & you take away the Mind put 
the Perceptions & you put the mind. (Notebooks 580) 
+ Say you the Mind is not the Perceptions. but that thing perceives. I answer you are abus'd 
by the words that & thing these are vague empty words without a meaning. (Notebooks 
581) 
This bundle theory temporarily saves the concept of the mind for Berkeley.4 But Berkeley’s 
positivism wanes as the Notebooks progress, and soon he denied premise (1) and (2) of the 
argument he makes in 579. But (3), which claims that the mind is not perceivable, Berkeley 
continues to affirm throughout his philosophical career. 
                                                        
 
4  There is some debate concerning whether or not Berkeley is actually endorsing a bundle theory in 
these passages, with most of the controversy revolving around whether or not Berkeley’s “+” sign in the 
margins indicated that he later rejected the view. Stephen Daniel has argued that these entries do not 
endorse a bundle theory and are in fact consistent with Berkeley’s mature theory of spirit. His theory 
appears most recently in “Berkeley’s Doctrine of Mind and the ‘Black List Hypothesis’: A Dialogue,” 
Southern Journal of Philosophy, 51, no. 1 (Mar 2013): 24-41. An example of a more traditional 
interpretation of Berkeley as a bundle theorist appears in Bertil Belfrage, “Berkeley’s Four Concepts of the 
Soul (1707-1709)”, in Reexamining Berkeley’s Philosophy, ed. Stephen Daniel (Toronto, University of 
Toronto Press, 2007), pg. 172-187. 
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Berkeley’s retreat from the positivism of premise (1) began when he affirmed the existence of 
the will, despite its lack of appearance in one’s perceptions. 
S The grand Cause of perplexity & darkness In treating of the Will, is that we Imagine it to be 
an object of thought…, we think we may perceive, contemplate & view it like any of our 
Ideas whereas in truth ‘tis no idea. Nor is there an Idea of it. tis toto coelo different from 
the Understanding i.e. from all our ideas. (Notebooks 643) 
Berkeley here affirms the existence of something (the will) which is not itself an idea and cannot 
be found in the understanding.5 So while he maintained that the will is not introspectively 
available, he no longer thought that this was a reason to reject the existence of the will. In other 
words, he denied the first premise of his earlier argument, that “If x exists, x can be perceived (i.e. 
there can be an idea of x).” This anti-positivist turn remains with Berkeley throughout his 
philosophical career, though the being that exists beyond perception/experience changes as his 
views develop. 
After turning from positivism by affirming the existence of unperceived will, Berkeley 
identified “spirit” or active being exclusively with the will: 
S The Spirit the Active thing that wch is Soul & God is the Will alone[.] The Ideas are effects 
impotent things. (Notebooks 712) 
But he later changed his mind, identifying spirit with “all that is active,” and this includes not 
willing alone but also the acts of perceiving and understanding. This willing, perceiving, thinking 
being Berkeley calls the mind, soul, spirit, or self: 
                                                        
 
5 One argumentative move that may confuse some readers is Berkeley’s move from the claim that 
the will is not an idea to the claim that there can be no idea of the will. As he puts it, “in truth ‘tis no idea. 
Nor is there an Idea of it.” To us, this might appear downright fallacious. Why does Berkeley think we 
cannot have an idea of something that is not itself an idea? The answer, as the seasoned reader of Berkeley 
might suspect, lies in Berkeley’s likeness principle, which he appeals to in Notebooks 657: “To ask have we 
an idea of ye Will or volition is nonsense. an idea can resemble nothing but an idea.” (See also Notebooks 
684) For more on why Berkeley thinks we should accept the likeness principle, see Kenneth Winkler, 
Berkeley: an Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pg. 137-149. 
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S. But the Grand Mistake is that we know not wt we mean by we our selves, our mind &c. tis 
most sure & certain that our Ideas are distinct from the Mind i.e. the Will, the Spirit. 
(Notebooks 847) 
S. I must not Mention the Understanding as a faculty or part of the Mind, I must include 
Understanding & Will &c in the word Spirit by wch I mean all that is active. I must not Say 
that the Understanding differs not from the particular Ideas, or the Will from particular 
Volitions. (Notebooks 848) 
S. The Spirit, the Mind, is neither a Volition nor an Idea. (Notebooks 849) 
Here Berkeley clearly denies any possibility of a bundle theory of the will, understanding, or mind. 
Instead he posits a sort of dualism; on the one hand, there is an active being which wills and 
understands, which is called spirit, and on the other hand, there are “objects of experience”, that 
is, passive ideas. And while he is not advocating a dualism of substance, Berkeley does claim that 
it is “most sure and certain that our ideas are distinct from the mind.”6 So, although at one point 
in the Notebooks he endorsed a bundle theory of the mind, Berkeley later rejects this and affirms 
that the mind is a distinct, active being, one that can neither be an idea nor be represented by an 
idea.  
Berkeley continued to affirm both that the self is not introspectable and that it is distinct from 
ideas in his first edition of the Principles. First, regarding the notion that the mind or spirit is a 
being distinct from its objects, Berkeley writes: 
But besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise 
something which knows or perceives them, and exercises divers operations, as willing, 
imagining, remembering about them. This perceiving, active being is what I call mind, 
spirit, soul or myself. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing 
entirely distinct from them, wherein they exist… (Principles 2)7 
                                                        
 
6 Berkeley thinks spirit is the only substance; ideas are not substances because they are wholly 
dependent upon spirit for their existence. 
7  References to all of Berkeley’s works other than the Philosophical Commentaries are from: 
George Berkeley, The Works of George Berkeley Bishop of Cloyne, ed. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop 
(London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, 1949). References to the Principles include the section number; 
references to De Motu and the Dialogues include page number. 
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The remarkable resemblance this passage bears to Berkeley’s late remarks in the Notebooks 
indicates that Berkeley likely wrote this section of the Principles with these entries of the 
Notebooks in mind.8 At the very least, it should be clear that Berkeley’s notion of mind did not 
change between the late remarks in the Notebooks and the first edition of the Principles. 
It is also clear that Berkeley continued to maintain that there can be no idea of the mind, and 
therefore that it cannot be found through introspection. Again, he writes: 
…there can be no idea formed of a soul or spirit… so far as I can see, the words will, soul, 
spirit, do not stand for different ideas, or in truth, for any idea at all, but for something 
which is very different from ideas, and which being an agent cannot be like unto, or 
represented by, any idea whatsoever. (Principles 27)9 
Again, here we see Berkeley claiming that to have an idea of spirit is impossible. Thus, Berkeley 
accepted his Humean position from the Notebooks concerning the non-introspectability of the 
self at least as late as his first publication of the Principles.  
Berkeley’s notion of spirit in the Notebooks and Principles is thus in one respect Humean; his 
denial of any direct experience of ourselves or of spirit in general anticipates Hume’s critique of 
the introspectability of the self. But nonetheless he affirms that the self is an active being distinct 
from the objects of perception, and this brings up the question, “how in fact can we know that 
there is an active, distinct being that is the self?” Hume and most others who assent to his critique 
of the introspectability of the self deny the existence of a distinct being that is the perceiving, 
thinking, and willing self. Is Berkeley being inconsistent? Or does he have an argument for the 
existence of the self and spirit that does not depend on the introspectability of the self? Most 
commentators agree that Berkeley’s response to this question is not consistent with non-
                                                        
 
8  Many of the passages from the Principles mirror entries from the Notebooks, from which many 
commentators have inferred that Berkeley used these Notebooks as a reference when writing the 
Principles, and maybe even the Dialogues and De Motu. At the very least, it seems Berkeley did not write 
the Notebooks and then leave them alone. 
9  See also Principles 89, 135, 138, 139, and 142. 
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introspectability of the self; they claim that Berkeley upholds some form of direct awareness of 
the self, upon which our knowledge of the existence of the self is founded.  
 
Berkeley on Self-Knowledge: Traditional Interpretations 
The opinion that Berkeley’s theory of self-knowledge throughout his mature period (1710-
1734) relies on some special first-personal access to the self exists even among his best 
commentators.10 While there are various types of positions attributed to Berkeley ranging from 
acquaintance theories to inner-sense theories, all share in that the self is perceived or felt 
“directly,” and on this basis we can be said to know many things about the self, including most 
importantly that it exists. For the sake of brevity, here I consider only one such interpretation, 
that of Kenneth Winkler. I have chosen Winkler’s interpretation only because I think it is the best 
and most textually sensitive interpretation, and not because I have some particular quarrel with 
his view which I do not have with others. Winkler’s interpretation is by and large correct, except 
for his small error of omission, which every other commentator also appears to make. My criticism 
of Winkler’s interpretation should apply equally to any other theory which supposes that Berkeley 
holds an introspectivist position regarding self-knowledge.11 
                                                        
 
10  This includes Winkler, Dicker, Adams, Cummins, and as far as I know, anyone else who has 
written about Berkeley’s theory of self-knowledge. Bennett is actually the only one who appears to 
challenge this perspective. He claims, “there are also indications that [Berkeley] thinks that his own 
existence is inferred from ideas which are immediately given, through the principle that there cannot be 
unowned ideas.” See Jonathan Bennett, Learning from Six Philosophers, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2001), pg. 156.  
11  I am considering Winkler’s interpretation from his 2011 article “Marvellous Emptiness: Berkeley 
on Consciousness and Self-Consciousness” in Berkeley’s Lasting Legacy: 300 Years Later, ed. Timo 
Airaksinen and Bertil Belfrage (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011), pg. 223-250. This 
theory is slightly different from the theory Winkler presents in his 1990 book Berkeley: An 
Interpretation. Robert Adams proposes a somewhat similar interpretation in his article “Berkeley’s 
‘Notion’ of Spiritual Substance,” Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 55, pg. 47-69. 
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Winkler argues that Berkeley held that the self is known through “subject-consciousness” 
rather than “object-consciousness.” The self is experienced as the subject of actions, rather than 
as an object of one’s understanding. Knowledge of the self derives from this first-person 
experience of oneself as the subject or performer of these acts. Thus the self is presented or known 
in a way that is immediate and non-inferential; to put it in popular contemporary terminology, it 
is “epistemically direct.” We are not simply aware of certain things from which we infer the 
existence of ourselves; rather, we are directly aware of the self itself, with no inferential apparatus 
necessary. 
The evidence for this position, though somewhat sparse given Berkeley’s rare treatment of the 
topic of self-knowledge, is very compelling.12 In the Principles, Berkeley claims that “We 
comprehend our own existence by inward feeling or reflection, and that of other spirits by reason” 
(Principles 89, second edition). Philonous in the Dialogues claims, 
I who am a spirit or thinking substance, exist as certainly, as I know my ideas exist. Farther, 
I know what I mean by the terms I and myself; and I know this immediately, or intuitively, 
though I do not perceive it as I perceive [an idea]. (Dialogues 231) 
...the being of my self, that is, my own soul, mind or thinking principle, I evidently know by 
reflexion. (Dialogues 233) 
Finally, in De Motu, Berkeley claims that “the sentient, percipient, thinking thing we know by 
conscientia quadam interna [a certain internal consciousness]” (De Motu 21 [latin], 36 
                                                        
 
12  The scarcity of Berkeley’s remarks about the nature of the mind is likely due to Berkeley’s loss of a 
manuscript in which he was planning to disseminate his theory of mind. He claims in a letter to his friend 
Samuel Johnson in 1729 that he “had made a considerable progress in it, but the manuscript was lost [in 
1715] during [his] travels in Italy,” and he never rewrote and published what was lost (Philosophical 
Correspondence with Samuel Johnson, pg. 282). He does remark on numerous occasions in the 
Notebooks his plans for a second and even third manuscript (which were to be part 2 and 3 of the 
Principles). The second’s subject matter was to contain his theory of mind and ethics, while the third was 
to contain his natural philosophy. The third was likely reworked into his 1721 De Motu, after Berkeley 
abandoned his plans for the tripartite Principles. See Notebooks 508, 583, 738, 792, 807 and 878 for 
references to his intentions for the tripartite Principles. 
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[english]).13 All these seem to imply that there is some special, direct awareness of the self that is 
unlike our apprehension of the objects of thought or perception. Winkler proposes that in all these 
passages, Berkeley is suggesting that this direct awareness of the self is subject self-awareness. 
This means: 
The mind itself [is not] an object that we contemplate and view, but a thing known through 
acting, operating, or performing… to know spirit is to experience oneself as acting, willing, 
and operating - to experience oneself as the subject of acts, rather than as an object.14 
Winkler is suggesting that Berkeley thought that experience or perception does not only include 
the objects of the understanding, but also the self. 
If the self is known through an epistemically direct subject self-consciousness, does this mean 
that the self is in fact introspectable? If yes, then my claim that Berkeley did not accept the 
introspectability of the self in his early career conflicts with Winkler’s interpretation.15 But to see 
if subject self-consciousness does in fact imply the self is introspectable, the definition of 
introspection must first be clarified. Ordinary definitions of introspection can be grouped into 
roughly two different definitions: 
INTROSPECTION1: The act of observing all present ideas (representations, objects of the 
understanding). 
INTROSPECTION2: The act of observing all present experience (representational and non-
representational). 
The former version is about only representational ideas, or those ideas of purely sensory content. 
The latter version includes these ideas, but also takes note of other objects of experience, like 
passions or feelings, volitions, the passing of time, etc. These phenomena are still a part of the 
                                                        
 
13  This section is loosely adapted from Winkler 2011, pg. 231. 
14  Winkler 2011, pg. 230. 
15  Of course, Winkler’s interpretation doesn’t have to be entirely correct to put pressure on my view, 
in fact, probably any other Berkeley commentator’s version will do. Most if not all commentators affirm 
that Berkeley thinks our awareness of the self is at least epistemically direct, if not metaphysically direct, 
and for this reason, they put pressure on my claim that Berkeley thinks the self is non-introspectable. 
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general character of experience, but they are non-representational; one cannot frame a 
representation of them in the mind as one does with simple and complex ideas. So the latter 
definition is broader than the former. The former definition includes only epistemically direct 
representations, whereas the latter definition includes all epistemically direct experience, 
representational or otherwise. 
If we adopt the former definition of introspection, then it follows that Berkeley clearly denies 
the introspectability of the self. For he continues to insist throughout his mature career, as he did 
in the Notebooks, that “all ideas… cannot represent unto us, by way of image or likeness, that 
which acts” (Principles 27). But if this is all we mean by introspection, then Berkeley may still 
affirm that there are non-representational ways of encountering the self directly while upholding 
the non-introspectability of the self. Winkler’s interpretation fits this description: subject self-
awareness is a non-representational but still epistemically direct means of self-knowledge. Thus, 
if by introspection we mean introspection in this former sense, Winkler’s Berkeley can claim that 
the self is not introspectable and yet maintain that the self is known directly. 
However, it must be admitted that if introspection is defined in this former sense, this 
definition would not be expansive enough to satisfy Hume. For, when denying the 
introspectability of the self, Hume does not simply call to attention his representational ideas, he 
instead claims he cannot find the self among all his impressions, including “Pain and pleasure, 
grief and joy, passions and sensations” (Treatise 1.4.6.2) and again, “heat or cold, light or shade, 
love or hatred, pain or pleasure” (Treatise 1.4.6.3).16 These are no mere mental pictures (to use 
the Wittgensteinian term) or representational ideas; these are acts, or at the very least they 
                                                        
 
16  References to Hume’s Treatise are from: David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (London: 
1739-40). URL: http://davidhume.org/texts/thn.html 
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contain some active content. Putatively, they tell us something about what the mind is doing, not 
just what is happening to it. And even among these things, which are known not just through 
sensory perception, but rather through some other means of awareness, Hume claims he can not 
find himself. Therefore, Hume affirms the non-introspectability of the self not just on the former, 
narrower definition of introspection, but even on the latter, broader definition. He does not just 
think that the self is not representationally available, it is not experientially available. On this 
definition of introspection, Winkler’s Berkeley would clearly be violating the non-introspectability 
of the self. For Winkler’s Berkeley believes that the self is experienced directly, although not 
representationally.  
Winkler’s Berkeley can be seen as upholding the non-introspectability of the self only in the 
former sense of introspection, and not the latter. But I nonetheless contend that Berkeley, like 
Hume, believed the self was not introspectable in both senses of introspection, though only during 
the early part of his career (1708-1710). I defend my interpretation in the next section. 
 
A Shift Regarding Self-Knowledge 
In this section, I aim to show that in the Notebooks and Principles, Berkeley thought that the 
self could be known by its effects alone, not directly by introspection. It is my contention that the 
view that is commonly attributed to Berkeley, one which like Winkler’s entails that the self is at 
least introspectable in some sense, only applies to Berkeley beginning in 1713, when he published 
the Dialogues. So, on my interpretation, Berkeley shifts his position regarding knowledge of the 
self from his early period (Notebooks [c. 1708] and Principles [1710]) to his middle period 
(beginning with Dialogues [1713]). The early view represents Berkeley in a somewhat more 
Humean light, while the later view is more Lockean or Malebranchean. 
The leading piece of evidence for my interpretation comes from Principles §27. Here Berkeley 
claims: 
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A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being… hence there can be no idea formed of a soul 
or spirit: for all ideas whatever, being passive and inert, vide Sect. 25, they cannot represent 
unto us, by way of image or likeness, that which acts. A little attention will make it plain to 
anyone, that to have an idea which shall be like that active principle of motion and change 
of ideas, is absolutely impossible. Such is the nature of spirit or that which acts, that it 
cannot be of itself perceived, but only by the effects which it produces. (Principles 27) 
Particularly the last sentence of this passage supports my interpretation. Berkeley’s claim that 
spirit “cannot be of itself perceived, but only by the effects which it produces” seems to imply that 
Berkeley does not think there is any epistemically direct experience of any spirit, including the 
spirit that is oneself. Rather, it is “perceived by the effects which it produces,” meaning that the 
self is inferred from its effects, or that which it causes.  
Obviously such an interpretation contradicts Winkler’s interpretation, or any other which 
supposes some direct apprehension of the self. Winkler recognizes this, claiming: 
If to say that spirit cannot itself be “perceived” is to say that it cannot itself be experienced, 
my proposal must be on the wrong track. But Principles 27, so understood, is flatly 
incompatible with Berkeley’s repeated declarations to the contrary.17 
Winkler then attempts to reinterpret 27 in such a way that makes it compatible with his 
interpretation, claiming that “the main burden of Principles 27 is to argue that there can be no 
idea of soul or spirit. This is not to deny that it can be experienced or known in a way ideas are 
not.”18 
Winkler’s motivation for reinterpreting Principles 27 is to make it consistent with what he 
calls “Berkeley’s repeated declarations to the contrary.” By this Winkler appears to be referring to 
the evidence I presented in §2, compiled from the Principles, Dialogues, and De Motu. All these 
passages claim that the self or spirit is known by reflexion or conscientia, which I am convinced 
imply that Berkeley, at the time of writing these passages, believed the self is experienced directly, 
                                                        
 
17  Winkler 2011, pg. 234. 
18  Ibid. 
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though not by way of representation. But almost every Berkeley commentator fails to note a 
fundamental aspect about the dating of all these endorsements of reflexion or conscientia. None 
of these passages about reflexion or conscientia appear in the the first edition of the Principles. 
The only passage in the Principles that endorses such a view is in Principles 89, but was added 
into the second edition, published 24 years later in 1734. The first edition of the Principles 
contains absolutely no mention of the self being known by reflection, inward sense, or conscientia; 
they only began to appear in the Dialogues, in 1713. So even if Berkeley did advocate for some 
type of direct experience of the self in 1710, he never mentions this in the Principles. 
This alone should be enough to make us question the fairness of using Berkeley’s later remarks 
(1713-1734) to reinterpret his earlier remarks. But there is even more evidence that suggests 
Berkeley did not yet accept the reflection/conscientia theory until later:  
S.  De Vrie will have it that we know the Mind as we do Hunger[,] not by Idea but sense or 
Conscientia[.] So will Malbranch. This is a Vain distinction. (Notebooks 888)19 
Here we have a passage that was very likely written after August 28th, 1708, where Berkeley 
explicitly denounces the inner sense theory of Malebranche and Gerard De Vries.20 This is a direct 
contradiction with his 1721 claim in De Motu that spirit is known by “a certain internal 
conscientia.”  
To make the progression more clear, consider the following timeline: 
                                                        
 
19  See also Notebooks 724, also a reference to (and criticism of) Malebranche’s theory. Also, 
Principles 136 is the section of the Principles indebted to this entry. 
20  On the very same page where Berkeley writes his final philosophical entries at the bottom 
(including entry 888, the last entry of the Notebooks), above these Berkeley wrote “August 28th. 1708 the 
Adventure of the Shirt.” (See Thomas, “Editor’s Introduction” to Philosophical Commentaries, page x) 
The philosophical entries at the bottom are written “small and crowded” into the space below the 
comment regarding the “adventure of the shirt,” indicating that Berkeley had written the “adventure of 
the shirt” when there was plenty of space on the page, only for it to become crowded when he later filled it 
with the philosophical entries. Thus, it is likely, though not certain, that these entries were written after 
August 28th, 1708. 
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1708:  Berkeley denounces inner-sense/conscientia as a means for self-knowledge in the 
Notebooks. 
1710:  Berkeley never mentions inner-sense/conscientia/reflection as a means for self-
knowledge in the Principles. He does say things that are incompatible with inner-
sense/conscientia/reflection in 25, 27, and 136. 
1713: Berkeley first endorses “reflection” and “reflex-act” as the means of knowing spirit 
or self in the Dialogues. 
1721: Berkeley endorses that spirit or self is known by “internal conscientia” in De Motu. 
1734: Berkeley endorses “reflection” or “inward feeling” as the means of knowing the self 
in the second edition of the Principles and Dialogues.  
It seems to me that the most reasonable explanation of Berkeley’s theory of self-knowledge is not 
to assume, as Winkler and others have previously done, that Berkeley affirmed the 
reflexion/conscientia theory throughout his published works. Rather, a better explanation 
portrays Berkeley as undergoing a shift between 1710 and 1713. For there is no indication of it in 
the 1710 edition of the Principles (and even some contrary evidence), as well as evidence that less 
than two years prior, he explicitly criticizes the conscientia theory. Therefore, I conclude that 
Berkeley did not think that spirit or self was to be known by reflexion/conscientia in the first 
edition of the Principles, and that if in fact there is to be knowledge of the self or spirit, he thought 
it must come by way of inference from spirit’s effects. 
 
Berkeley’s Causal Arguments from the “Effects” 
The task at hand, then, is to discover from the first edition of the Principles just how Berkeley 
thought spirit or self is known by its effects. The theory must not rely upon any first-personal 
special access to the self through introspection; for to appeal to this kind of evidence would be to 
violate the claim that spirit is not known by anything other than its effects. 
Berkeley’s argument for the existence of spirit appears in Principles §25-33. In Principles 25, 
Berkeley begins by inviting his reader to participate in a thought experiment concerning our ideas: 
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All our ideas… are visibly inactive, there is nothing of power or agency included in them… 
To be satisfied of the truth of this, there is nothing else requisite but a bare observation of 
our ideas. For since they and every part of them exist only in the mind, it follows that there 
is nothing in them but what is perceived. But whoever shall attend to his ideas, whether of 
sense or reflection, will not perceive in them any power or activity; there is therefore no 
such thing contained in them. (Principles 25) 
Jonathan Bennett dismisses this thought experiment, because he does “not know what thought-
experiment [he is] being invited to perform.”21 He asks, “How do I go about looking for activity in 
my ideas?... [and] why should I infer that this holds for all ideas always?”22 The latter question is 
easily dealt with23, but the former question is formidable since Berkeley does not explicitly define 
activity in Principles 1-25. But shortly after, in Principles 28, he does offer a characterization of 
activity based on experience: 
It is no more than willing, and straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy: and by the 
same power it is obliterated, and makes way for another. This making and unmaking of 
ideas does very properly denominate the mind active. Thus much is certain, and grounded 
on experience… (Principles 28) 
And in Principles 53, Berkeley equates activity with efficient causation: 
[There are some who] will have God alone to be the immediate efficient cause of all things.24 
These men saw that amongst all the objects of sense, there was none which had any power 
or activity included in it… (Principles 53) 
These passages seem to suggest that a thing is active only insofar as it causes ideas.25 But while in 
Principles 53 Berkeley calls this “efficient causation”, his own notion of causation never really 
                                                        
 
21  Bennett 2001, pg. 159. Bennett, rejecting the thought experiment because of its apparent lack of 
set-up, proposes that Berkeley thinks the passivity of ideas can be known a priori. I, however, see no 
reason to deny that Berkeley thought his thought experiment was decisive, and thus think there is no 
reason to find an a priori argument. 
22  Ibid.  
23  By inviting us to examine our ideas, Berkeley uses “idea” in a broad sense. This would include 
ideas of memory. Thus, if we consider a sample of ideas from our current perceptions or past memories, 
we will find that every single one is passive in exactly the same way. To inductively infer that all ideas will 
always be passive would seem a very plausible move to Berkeley. 
24  Certainly Berkeley considered Malebranche to be a member of this group. He may well have, after 
publication, considered Newton to be a member of this group as well, but Newton’s “General Scholium” to 
his Principia was added in the 1713 edition. 
25  See also Notebooks 830-831. 
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distinguishes between efficient and final causation. For Berkeley, the causal status of a being with 
regards to any idea depends on whether the idea follows from the being’s will. We can define 
causation for Berkeley like this: 
BERKELEY’S CAUSE: S causes x iff (1) S is a subject that wills that x, and (2) x occurs as a 
direct result of S willing that x. 
This notion of a cause is primarily one of efficient causation, for it requires that S is the principle 
of change in the realization of x. It also, however, sneaks in some type of final causation, in that 
for something to be a cause it must will that x occur. This willing, presumably, cannot be purely 
random; the very nature of willing requires that there is a reason for x, an end for which it is done 
(at least Berkeley appeared to think this was the case). So Berkeley’s theory of causation, at least 
here, appears to blend together notions of efficient and final causation. 
I do not mean to defend Berkeley’s strict notion of causation; in fact, I find it to be one of the 
weaker areas of his philosophy. But it should be clear that given Berkeley’s identification of 
activity with causation, Berkeley is right that one will not find any such thing among his/her ideas. 
Berkeley expects, and I think rightly so, that we do not perceive causes as we perceive our ideas; 
causes elude us in our sensory phenomenology. So, since we do not have ideas of causal powers, 
we may properly denominate our ideas “inactive,” or rather “passive.” Further, since for Berkeley 
an idea can only represent another idea, it follows that we cannot have an idea of (i.e. an idea that 
represents) an active thing.26 So all of our phenomenology, qua idea, is inactive, nor can it 
represent to us an active thing. 
                                                        
 
26  The claim that “an idea can only represent another idea” is an instantiation of Berkeley’s likeness 
principle. I am of the opinion that if we accept a strictly sensory definition of an idea, then Berkeley’s 
likeness principle is true. See footnote 6 for more on Berkeley’s controversial likeness principle. 
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Having made the case that ideas are wholly passive and thus can neither be nor represent 
causes, Berkeley makes his argument for the existence of spirit: 
We perceive a continual succession of ideas, some are anew excited, others are changed or 
totally disappear. There is therefore some cause of these ideas whereon they depend, and 
which produces and changes them. That this cause cannot be any quality or idea or 
combination of ideas, is clear from the preceding section. It must therefore be a substance… 
the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active substance or spirit. (Principles 26) 
There are actually two similar yet separable arguments being offered in this passage, one from 
change of ideas and one from the very existence of ideas: 
 ARGUMENT FROM THE CHANGE OF IDEAS: 
(1) There is a change (i.e. succession) of ideas. 
(2) If there is a change of ideas, there must be a cause of this change in ideas. 
(3) Ideas cannot be causes. 
(4) Therefore, the cause of this perceived change in ideas cannot be something that is 
itself an idea. 
Therefore, there must be something non-ideal that causes the perceived change in ideas 
(and this we call spirit). 
ARGUMENT FROM THE EXISTENCE OF IDEAS: 
(1) There are ideas. 
(2) If there are ideas, there must be a cause of these ideas. 
(3) Ideas cannot be causes. 
(4) Therefore, the cause of the existence of these ideas cannot be something that is 
itself an idea. 
Therefore, there must be something non-ideal that causes the ideas to exist (and this we 
call spirit). 
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Both arguments share the same general form: they argue from (1) an observed feature about ideas 
along with (2) a causal principle and (3) the causal inefficacy of ideas to the final conclusion that 
there is an active thing that is not itself an idea. Premise (3) was already discussed, in Berkeley’s 
claim that we do not have ideas of causes, and thus ideas cannot be causes. Premise (2) in each is 
obviously the most controversial and problematic, and is the premise with which Hume would 
surely disagree. But before discussing the importance of (2), I want to flag another problem with 
these arguments. Both arrive at the conclusion that spirit exists in a causal relation to ideas, but 
this conclusion contains no other information about spirit. There is a significant gap between the 
notion of spirit argued for here, and Berkeley’s definitions of spirit elsewhere in the Principles: 
For by the word spirit we mean only that which thinks, wills, and perceives; this, and this 
alone, constitutes the signification of the term. (Principles 138)  
This perceiving, active being is what I call mind, spirit, soul, or myself. (Principles 2) 
A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being: as it perceives ideas, it is called the 
understanding, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them, it is called the will. 
(Principles 27) 
In all these passages, Berkeley defines spirit in the same way he does at the end of the Notebooks; 
recall his claim that “I must include Understanding & Will [etc.] in the word Spirit by [which] I 
mean all that is active” (Notebooks 848).27 But the conclusion of the two arguments includes only 
activity in the narrower sense of willing alone; it disregards these other important aspects of active 
being that are fundamental to Berkeley’s (and most other’s) concept of what the self is. Therefore, 
even if the above arguments are sound, they do not offer knowledge of spirit as a perceiving and 
thinking being, but rather only as a willing being.  
I do not think that this problem devastates Berkeley’s proposed theory of how the self is known 
using the causal maxim; rather, I only think it indicates that Berkeley’s strict notion of 
                                                        
 
27  See also 854 and 871. 
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causation/activity which he appeals to in Principles 26 needs to be broadened in such a way that 
is consistent with some of his other remarks about activity. As noted above, in the Notebooks 
Berkeley conceived of spirit not just as a thing that wills, but rather as “all that is active.” Also, 
throughout the Notebooks and the first edition of the Principles, Berkeley seems to think of 
perception, willing, imagining, remembering, thinking, feeling, etc. as acts, presumably all 
included in spirit, or “all that is active.” Thus, willing is just one way that spirit acts/causes. It 
might be helpful to conceive of spirit as an active being from which the acts of perceiving, willing, 
thinking, etc., “emanate.” Spirit is a simple, active principle, and its various acts as we conceive of 
them are its emanations or fulgurations. 
Is activity conceived of in this way still properly termed causal? Yes, if we qualify Berkeley’s 
notion of causation. Recall that earlier I defined Berkeley’s cause in this way: 
 BERKELEY’S CAUSE: S causes x iff (1) S is a subject that wills that x, and (2) x occurs as a 
direct result of S willing that x. 
This definition of causation, it was noted, builds in notions of efficient and final causation. But we 
might distinguish a second type of cause, one that is not mutually exclusive with the above 
definition, but is broader and less restrictive: 
 BERKELEY’S ACTIVE CAUSE: S causes x iff S is a subject that is necessary for the realization 
of x. 
An active cause is not necessarily a final cause, an efficient cause, or a total cause, though if certain 
conditions are met, an active cause could be any one of these things. But in its most minimal sense, 
an active cause is none of these. It is not necessarily a final cause (in Berkeley’s sense), because 
the causes’ effects need not follow from the will of the being that is the active cause. Nor is it 
necessarily an efficient cause, for it may be that some other thing is the primary or foremost 
principle of motion or change of the effects. Nor is it necessarily a total cause, for it may exist and 
yet not be sufficient for the realization of the effects. For x to be an active cause of y, all that is 
required is that the full realization of y would not happen if not for x. All that is implied by claiming 
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x is an active cause of y is that y would not be fully actualized if not for x. An active cause is just 
necessary for making something actual, rather than less than actual, or potential. 
To get a better sense of how this theory of active causation might work, let us apply this notion 
of active causation to one of the various effects that Berkeley thinks spirit in some sense enacts: a 
perception. An actual perception as opposed to a potential perception will be a perception 
actually perceived by a mind. A potential perception will vary depending on one’s metaphysical 
intuitions about the status of the potentially perceivable world. For Berkeley (depending on 
idealist/phenomenalist interpretation) all potential perceptions are either ideas in the mind of 
God (idealist interpretation) or powers to make a human being have an idea (phenomenalist 
interpretation). But for a materialist or dualist, potential perceptions would just be unperceived 
matter. For a phenomenalist of a non-Berkeleyan bent, potential perceptions would just be the 
“permanent possibilities” for perception (Mill). Regardless of one’s metaphysics of substance, 
there is usually at least some sense in which that which is actually perceived is different from that 
which is potentially but not actually perceived. And whatever this potentiality of perception may 
be, the actuality of a perception is, on this theory, accounted for by the mind’s activity qua active 
causation. It is the activity of the mind that makes a potential perception into an actual one.  
Perception is just the paradigm case used here, but we might apply the notion of an active 
cause to whatever else might be thought to exist in the bundle of experience. Depending on what 
one finds in their bundle of experience, this might include thoughts, ideas, volitions, passions, 
feelings, etc.28 All of these could plausibly have an active cause. 
                                                        
 
28  Again, this will depend on what one takes to be evident in one’s phenomenology, even in the 
broader sense of introspection. Only the most extreme reductive empiricist, or perhaps the most hard-
core Parmenidean rationalist, will deny that there is any first-person experience.  
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Based on this notion of an active cause, Berkeley’s argument can be reworked in a way that 
gives a more satisfactory definition of spirit: 
ARGUMENT FROM THE EXISTENCE OF EXPERIENCE: 
(1) There exists an (actual) bundle of experience. 
(2) If there exists an (actual) bundle of experience, then there exists a distinct entity 
which is the active cause of it (i.e. which makes the potential experience into actual 
experience). 
Therefore, there exists a distinct entity which is the active cause of this bundle of 
experience. 
We can then call an entity that is the active cause of the bundle of experience spirit: 
SPIRIT =df an entity that produces a bundle of experience. 
Therefore, if the above argument is indeed sound, we do in fact know that spirit exists, insofar as 
by “spirit” we mean the above definition. It is then a definitional matter to move to knowledge of 
the self: 
SELF =df the spirit that is the active cause of the bundle of experience that is “specially 
present.” 
Here, “specially present” is an attempt to define one’s phenomenology without begging the 
question of there existing a distinct experiencer of the phenomenology. It is meant to denote one’s 
present experience, regardless of whether it is experienced or produced by some distinct being. 
Such a premise even the most skeptical philosopher regarding the substantiality of the self can 
agree to; Hume, Wittgenstein, Lichtenberg, Mill, Mach, and (early) Quine would all seemingly 
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admit of its truth. Unless one is to claim that there is no extant phenomenology which is in some 
sense specially present, this part of the definition of the self ought not to be objectionable.29  
From this it should be clear that if the argument is sound, we can be said to have knowledge 
not just of spirit in general but also of the self, for few if any will object to the definition’s key claim 
that there is some bundle of experience that is “specially present.” But is the argument in fact 
sound? Premise (1) is rather uncontroversial; in fact, if one admits that there is a bundle of 
experience that is “specially present,” it will follow that there exists at least one bundle of 
experience. The argument is also clearly valid, it just being an instance of modus ponens. But 
premise (2) is clearly contestable, particularly for those who seek to ground all knowledge in 
experience. This key premise is the subject of the following section. 
 
Causal Maxims 
In each of the three arguments for the self offered above, premise (2) is a variation of the same 
type of maxim: a causal maxim. A causal maxim simply claims that if some observable thing or 
event exists/happens, then there must be a cause of that thing/event. This maxim plays a key role 
in the arguments above; for the arguments to indeed work, this premise must be known. But 
Hume, who Berkeley mirrors with regards to the introspectability of the self, criticizes this maxim, 
claiming that it cannot be known certainly, neither by intuition nor demonstration. And the notion 
                                                        
 
29  I have, in this paragraph, continued to use language in a way that might imply there is a distinct 
being, separate from the “specially present” phenomenology. I do this not because I want to imply this, 
but because our language community does not have an expression for the concept I am trying to develop; 
in ordinary speech we always refer to “my perceptions” and “my phenomenology.” The point of this 
paragraph is to remove the “my” without losing the connotation that there is some phenomenology that 
exists which bears all the marks of an acquaintance relationship.  
  There are still some philosophers who may deny that there is a “specially present” 
phenomenology. Particularly, some hard-core reductionists may deny that they have any phenomenology. 
Also, a hard core rationalist, like Parmenides or maybe even Plato, might also deny this. 
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of causation Hume argues one gains from experience is very “thin”; a far departure from what the 
Berkeleyan arguments for the self require.30 I want to suggest two possible directions that 
Berkeley might take to avoid the Humean criticism of the causal maxim. The first is to claim (in 
rather rationalist fashion) that the causal maxim is in fact known a priori, contrary to Hume’s 
various criticisms. The second is to claim (in a more empiricist fashion) that the causal maxim is 
known by experience. Both answers would not appeal to Hume, but for very different reasons.31  
Hume’s criticism of the a prioricity and certainty of the causal maxim appears (among other 
places) in Treatise 1.3.3: 
‘Tis a general maxim in philosophy, that whatever begins to exist, must have a cause of 
existence… [If] we examine this maxim by the idea of knowledge [explained in 1.3.1], we 
shall discover in it no mark of any such intuitive certainty; but on the contrary shall find, 
that ‘tis of a nature quite foreign to that species of conviction. (Treatise 1.3.3.1) 
Hume’s criticism of this maxim is based on his definitions of knowledge and certainty; he claims 
“all certainty arises from the comparison of ideas, and from the discovery of such relations as are 
unalterable, so long as the ideas continue the same” (Treatise 1.3.3.2). Not finding causation to 
be among this class of relations, Hume denies that there can in fact be any certainty about it. He  
concludes that “it is not from knowledge or any scientific reasoning, that we derive the opinion of 
                                                        
 
30  Again, I am likely being anachronistic here. Just as Hume’s bundle theory is more complicated 
than I have suggested, his notion of causation is more complicated that simple constant conjunction. But 
among the plethora of suggestions for how to make sense of Hume’s remarks on causation, no 
interpretations would sufficiently play the role that the Berkeleyan arguments for self-knowledge require. 
31 It should be noted that the motivating question of this section (why should one accept the causal 
maxim in light of Humean critiques of causation) is obviously not a question Berkeley would have 
considered, since he published mostly before Hume’s criticisms ever appeared (1739), and certainly before 
they became popular or important. I ask this question in this section not because I expect Berkeley to have 
a well-formulated answer, but rather because the Humean critiques of causation are difficult and 
important problems for anyone who accepts a causal maxim to ground a metaphysical truth. If Berkeley’s 
argument for the existence of the self is to be viable for a contemporary audience, the theory ought to be 
able to respond to Hume’s criticisms given their apparent power.  
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the necessity of a cause to every new production, [therefore] that opinion must necessarily arise 
from observation and experience” (Treatise 1.3.3.9). 
How exactly Hume thinks the causal maxim arises from observation and experience, as well 
as Hume’s appraisal of its efficacy in philosophy, are widely disputed topics. However, it is 
generally agreed that the notion of causation developed by Hume involves two components: 
HUME’S CAUSE: x is the cause of y iff  
1) x is constantly conjoined with y, and 
2) y “necessarily” follows from x.  
The key point of contention among interpreters of Hume regards what Hume means by 
“necessarily,” and whether or not Hume’s version of (2) is strong or “thick” enough to support the 
use of the causal maxim in metaphysics and natural theology. Traditionally, Hume has been 
interpreted as endorsing a very weak or “thin” notion of necessity, though this interpretation has 
come under fire by some interpreters more recently. It is the Hume of lore that I consider here 
rather than these more recent interpretations. This is not because I think the traditional 
interpretation is correct, but rather because it portrays Hume in a way that poses a significant and 
plausible challenge to the use of the causal maxim in metaphysics, especially for an empiricist. 
Viewed this way, Hume’s critique of causation can be seen as a direct criticism of Berkeley’s 
version of the causal maxim and its use in justifying knowledge of the self. 
Hume seems to define necessity as a matter of custom or expectation of the mind, rather than 
any metaphysical fact about the world: 
This connexion, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this customary transition of the 
imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression, from 
which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion. Nothing farther is in the case. 
(Enquiry 7.2.28)32 
                                                        
 
32  References to Hume’s Enquiry are from: David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding (London: 1773).  
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This weak notion of necessity effectively undermines causal maxim’s usefulness in metaphysical 
speculation; instead making it a habit born of the mind or brain’s expectation. When Hume says 
x is the cause of y, Hume is not claiming that x possesses some actual power to bring about y, but 
is instead claiming that the mind, by habit or custom, expects y to follow from the presence of x.  
It is clear that this notion of causation is incapable of playing the role Berkeley requires in 
premise (2), precisely because Berkeley uses premise (2) to ground a metaphysical claim about 
the existence of spirit, and therefore the self. Since Hume’s notion of causation is only a fact about 
the way humans think rather than a fact about the way the world works, it would fail to establish 
that there is a metaphysical substance which is an active cause of the bundle of experience. At 
best, it could infer that there is a customary or habitual expectation of the existence of the self, a 
conclusion far too weak for Berkeley’s purposes. Therefore, it appears that if Berkeley’s argument 
for the self is to succeed, Berkeley must reject the Humean definition of causation in favor of a 
stronger, metaphysical definition.33 
As I suggested above, there are at least two distinct approaches that Berkeley might adopt to 
subvert the Humean rejection of a metaphysical definition of causation. The first approach is the 
a priori approach; on this theory, Berkeley would deny Hume’s claim that the “opinion [of the 
necessity of a cause] must necessarily arise from observation and experience” (Treatise 1.3.3.9). 
Recall that Hume arrived at this conclusion because the causal maxim did not fit the criteria for 
intuitive or demonstrative certainty, based on his theory of knowledge and certainty developed in 
1.3.1. Thus, if Berkeley is to claim that the causal maxim is known a priori, either by intuition or 
demonstration, he will need to in some way subvert the Humean arguments to the contrary. 
                                                        
 
33 As noted above, I am a more traditional, anachronistic interpretation of Hume. There is plenty of 
evidence that Hume did not accept the conclusions that I am attributing to him.  
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Berkeley never attempts to demonstrate the causal maxim, nor is it likely that he even thought it 
possible to do so.34 I think the more plausible option, one which Berkeley may have accepted, is 
that the causal maxim is known by intuition. Since Hume’s rejection of the intuitive certainty 
regarding the causal maxim follows from his (very empiricist) definition of knowledge/certainty, 
an affirmation of the intuitive certainty of the causal maxim likely must reject Hume’s definition 
of knowledge/certainty. So if Berkeley is to be seen as accepting the causal maxim as intuitively 
certain, this would consist in denying Hume’s empiricist definition of knowledge/certainty, in 
favor of a likely more rationalist definition.35 
There is some evidence that Berkeley does think the causal maxim is indeed axiomatic and 
known a priori: 
G.N. Ex nihilo nihil fit. this (saith Spinoza op:posth:p 464) & ye like are called veritates aeternae 
because nullam fidem habent extra mentem.36 to make this axiom have a positive 
signification, one should express it thus. Every Idea has a Cause i.e. is produced. by a Will. 
(Notebooks 831) 
While it may initially appear that Berkeley is endorsing Spinoza’s position in this passage, this is 
not necessarily the case. Berkeley may only be endorsing the causal principle, and not Spinoza’s 
a priori grounding of it. His expression that the axiom ought to be expressed positively doesn’t 
include that it is an “eternal truth” known by reason alone. So while Berkeley definitely is 
                                                        
 
34  While this doesn’t appear to be the route Berkeley takes, it should be noted that his empiricist 
predecessors, Hobbes and Locke, both attempt to demonstrate a causal maxim; Hume even singles them 
out (along with Samuel Clarke) in Treatise 1.3.3. While Berkeley does not do so, it may be a possibility for 
the empiricist to show that Hume’s criticism of the demonstrability of the causal maxim is incorrect. 
However, I think Berkeley is right in finding this solution to be unpromising. 
35 Of course, a Kantian transcendental solution is also a possibility; on this solution, the causal 
maxim would be a “synthetic a priori” truth, rather than the more traditionally rationalist analyticity of a 
priori truths. 
36  Translation from the latin:  
Out of nothing, nothing comes. this (saith Spinoza op:posth:p 464) & ye like are called eternal truths 
because they have no credence outside of the mind. 
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endorsing a version of Spinoza’s maxim, there is no conclusive evidence from this passage to show 
he endorses Spinoza’s characterization of it as an eternal truth known by reason alone.37 
Further, if we examine the context in which Notebooks 831 appears, we find that in the 
previous entry, Berkeley appeals to experience as evidence for the causal maxim: 
G Why may we not conceive it possible for God to create things out of Nothing. certainly we 
our selves create in some wise whenever we imagine. (Notebooks 830) 
Here, Berkeley appears to endorse that we do in fact experience our own causal power as we 
imagine. This reappears in Principles 28, where he claims, 
I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the scene as oft as I think 
fit. It is no more than willing, and straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy; and by 
the same power it is obliterated, and makes way for another… Thus much is certain, and 
grounded on experience[.] (Principles 28) 
This restatement of Notebooks 830 in the Principles makes very clear that Berkeley thinks that 
our notion of causal power is grounded on experience. Notebooks 831, on the other hand, does 
not appear in a restated form in the Principles. 
Berkeley’s statements in Principles 28 and its Notebooks counterpart show that it is likely that 
Berkeley thought the causal maxim was not known a priori but rather through experience, at least 
in his early period (1708-1710). For while Berkeley does often treat the causal maxim as if it is 
intuitive, nowhere does he explicitly claim the causal maxim can be known without experience. 
Berkeley is generally disdainful of a priori knowledge, and may in fact have thought it impossible. 
Berkeley did not even think that mathematical truths are known a priori. It simply seems more 
                                                        
 
37  It is also worth noting that Berkeley denounces the veritates aeternae earlier in Notebooks 735: 
“Qu: wt becomes of the aeternae veritates ? Ansr they vanish.” We should treat this passage with caution, 
though, since it develops out of a theory of demonstration and certainty that Berkeley was developing at 
this time which it is not clear he accepted later. See Notebooks 727-740. 
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likely given his general empiricist leanings that Berkeley did not affirm the causal maxim on a 
priori grounds, but rather on experiential grounds, as he explicitly declares in Principles 28.38 
If Berkeley’s theory of the mental experience of causation is to ground knowledge of the causal 
maxim, then for Berkeley there are two stipulations that it must meet. First, the experience must 
be of the causal power itself (i.e. “causal transparency”), not just the constant conjunction of cause 
and effect. For if the experience is just of a constant conjunction of cause and effect and not of the 
causal power itself, then Berkeley cannot properly claim that there is direct experience of 
causation, and thus will not have any experiential evidence for the causal maxim that Hume did 
not consider and refute. Second, the experience of causation must not be via idea, since ideas are 
passive, causes active. Thus, the transparency of the causal power of the self must derive from 
some other introspective acquaintance relationship. 
Whether or not our causal power is in fact transparent must be settled on phenomenological 
grounds. For my part, I must own that just as I cannot introspect myself, so too I cannot introspect 
the causal power that brings about ideas in my imagination. But I may be looking in the wrong 
place, as it is not clear from Berkeley’s work exactly what type of awareness this transparency 
comes from.  
Nonetheless, there is still another problem with Berkeley’s attempt to ground the causal 
maxim in experience. One’s own direct experience of causal power in the exercise of her 
imagination will justify the following proposition: 
                                                        
 
38  Other more rationalist interpretations of Berkeley like McCracken’s, Ott and Hight’s, Bracken’s, 
and Loeb’s will likely disagree with me on this point. But most who suppose Berkeley to be hiding 
rationalist principles are often guilty of inferring that his somewhat rationalist-seeming metaphysics is 
rooted in a rationalist epistemology. As far as I can tell, Berkeley thought of himself as an unqualified 
empiricist, despite his occasional use of principles that appear rationalist. For a helpful defence of 
Berkeley as an empiricist, see Michael Ayers, “Was Berkeley an Empiricist or a Rationalist” in Cambridge 
Companion to Berkeley, ed. Kenneth Winkler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pg. 34-62. 
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A: The present imaginative idea has a cause. 
Further, suppose we grant that in every instance of one’s exercise of her imagination, she directly 
experiences the causal power of her imaginative ideas. This would justify the following 
proposition: 
B: Every past or present imaginative idea has a cause. 
But it is not clear how one may infer from A or B to the following causal maxim: 
C: Every imaginative idea must have a cause. 
Nor is it clear how one may infer from A, B, or C to the following more general causal maxim: 
D: Every idea must have a cause. 
These are general inductive problems that call into question whether one is justified in 
generalizing to a universal claim from a particular sample. While Berkeley generally appears to be 
unperturbed by such inductive puzzles39, it is nevertheless a problem which he does not explicitly 
address.  
So, there are at least two potential problems for Berkeley’s attempt to ground the causal 
maxim in experience. First, there is the phenomenological concern summarized by the following 
question: do we actually experience the causal power involved in imagining our own ideas? I am 
inclined to think the answer is no. Second, there is the inductive concern summarized by this 
question: can experience of the causal power involved in imagining ideas justify a more general 
causal principle? If the problem of induction is truly a problem, one must also answer no to this 
question.  
I do not intend for these two objections to Berkeley’s theory of the grounding of the causal 
maxim to be taken as reasons for dismissing Berkeley’s theory altogether. I simply state them as 
                                                        
 
39  Cf. footnote 24. 
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challenges which require a response; whether there is in fact a viable response that has not been 
addressed in this paper can be taken up in future research. 
 
Conclusion 
To conclude: I have argued that Berkeley in his early philosophy (1708-1710) held that the self 
could not be directly apprehended through introspection, even under the broadest definition of 
introspection. Instead, during this period, Berkeley thought that the self must be known by means 
of inference, which involves an all-important causal maxim. And while all other components of 
the argument appear to be at least plausible or even certain, it is not clear, at least by what has 
been discussed, whether or not the causal maxim should be accepted. We’ve seen that Berkeley’s 
proposed grounding of the causal maxim in experience faces significant phenomenological and 
inductive problems, which potentially undermine his proposal. 
It is worth noting, however, that if Berkeley’s causal maxim (or one similar) is not granted, 
then seemingly the only alternative is a bundle theory where at least in some sense the “specially 
present” bundle of experience is metaphysically brute. Many philosophers, particularly 
empiricists, may have no trouble accepting this conclusion; for them, there is no implausibility in 
supposing that there is no active being which contributes to the realization of the bundle of 
experience. But I suspect there are some empiricists who will find this answer unsatisfactory, 
perhaps equally or even more so than Berkeley’s proposed answer. These philosophers, myself 
included, may find that pursuing Berkeley’s answer is worthwhile, however fruitful or unfruitful 
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